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IN THE WAKE OF EMPAGRAN-LIGHTS OUT ON
FOREIGN ACTIVITY FALLING UNDER SHERMAN
ACT JURISDICTION? COURTS CARVE OUT A
PREVAILING STANDARD
Kelly L. Tucker*
One of the basic problems of any legal system has been, and still is,
the question of how far any national law may be applied to and enforced
against conduct committed outside its territory. Perhaps the area where
this problem arises most frequently in the United States courts is in
antitrust litigation. The antitrust laws in the United States proscribe
"every contract, combination... , or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states or with foreign nations."'
Either private or government parties may bring antitrust actions in
the United States. The Department of Justice may bring suit under the
Sherman Act and has stated that its purpose of protecting against
anticompetitive acts is to ensure open and free markets, protect
consumers, and prevent conduct that impedes competition.2 Congress
intended private antitrust enforcement under the Sherman Act to serve
the same purpose. The courts have consistently emphasized that private
antitrust enforcement is designed "not merely to provide private relief,
but . . . to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust
laws."3  Relief in private antitrust suits may include treble damages,
attorneys' fees, and, where appropriate, equitable relief. Because of the
high legislative importance placed on competition and fair trade, foreign
*J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A.,
International Politics, 2003, American University. The author wishes to thank her
fellow members of the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law for their
guidance, assistance, and insightful input on the publication of this Note-
particularly Gary Varnavides, Alexander Sellinger, and Richard Blashka.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
2. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations § 1 (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines]. These
Guidelines provide a framework for businesses engaged in international operations for a
general overview of the DOJ's enforcement operations.
3. Cal. v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) (internal quotations omitted)).
807
808 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LA W
plaintiffs may bring actions under the Sherman Act. The Court observed
that even "[t]reble-damages suits by foreigners who have been
victimized by antitrust violations clearly may contribute to the pro-
tection of American consumers."
4
This Note will discuss the current state of American extraterritorial
jurisdiction over privately-initiated lawsuits, filed by both foreign and
domestic plaintiffs, alleging foreign anticompetitive conduct. This Note
proposes that, contrary to contemporaneous commentary predicting a
circuit split in the wake of Empagran v. F. Hoffinann-LaRoche and its
progeny,5 a concrete standard exists under the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act ("FTAIA") 6 as to the permissible reach of U.S. courts'
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Section I outlines the history of the extra-
territorial application of the Sherman Act to conduct abroad. Section II
discusses the current state of the law. Section III proposes an extra-
territorial jurisdiction causation standard has emerged post-Empagran,
analyzes the vulnerabilities of parties involved in foreign conduct, and
explores the avenues of suit still available to foreign or domestic
plaintiffs for injuries suffered as a result of activities conducted abroad.
I. HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
IN THE U.S. ANTITRUST ARENA
Congress enacted the Sherman Act to prohibit unreasonable
restraints on trade and punish violators.7 This federal law extends not
only to American companies, but also, under certain circumstances, to
foreign companies either doing business in the United States or those
that conduct anticompetitive business activities that interfere with
exports of an American company.' Both the U.S. Government and
4. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978). While Pfizer was a
suit by the U.S. Government, the Court recognized the importance of private causes of
action under the antitrust laws.
5. Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
("Empagran IF').
6. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006) (as it applies to extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act).
7. Id. § 1 (The purpose of Section 1 of the Sherman Act is to prohibit "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade."); Id. § 2 (The purpose Section 2 of the Sherman Act is directed at "every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize.").
8. For a long period of time, the Government and courts adopted what some
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private litigants may bring causes of action against foreign corporations
alleging anticompetitive business conduct abroad. 9 Such suits require
U.S. courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over these foreign
entities. These suits allow private litigants to bring actions for damages
suffered as a result of violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
among other federal laws. 0 The Sherman Act, as originally adopted, did
not define the extent to which such foreign actors or domestic actors
engaging in foreign activity are subject to American antitrust juris-
diction. Instead, courts have largely been left to determine the breadth
of the extraterritorial application of United States laws in the antitrust
context. 11
The Sherman Act applies to conduct abroad under the broad
language of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states. 12 Many plaintiffs fmd American courts most
favorable to private antitrust suits. Unique to American law, the
Sherman Act, provides for the imposition of treble damages against the
offender, as well as attorneys' fees.13 This attracts many foreign and
characterize as a wide-reaching approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
enterprises in the context of antitrust law. See, e.g., ENFORCING ANTITRUST AGAINST
FOREIGN ENTERPRISES 7 (Comelis Canenbley ed. 1981). However, recent cases and
statutes have moved away from the more flexible "rule-of-reason" approach, which
takes into consideration conflicts of law principles, as well as considerations of
international comity, toward the more formulaic "effects doctrine." See id.
(characterizing the "rule-of-reason" approach); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S.
764 (1993) (discussing the effects doctrine). As discussed infra, the current state of the
effects doctrine does not do away with considerations of international comity; it merely
embodies such principles in its application. See also F. Hoffmann-LaRoche v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (stating that applying the approach suggested by
the court properly considers the economic realities of foreign markets and does not
improperly interfere with foreign state antitrust laws).
9. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006).
10. Id. §§ 16, 26.
11. MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 42-43 (3d ed.
Kluwer Law Int'l 2006) (noting the confusion in the courts as to the application of
extraterritorial jurisdiction).
12. U.S. CONST. art. 1, sec. 8, cl.3. "Trade with foreign nations" is generally
understood to include commerce with any foreign party, not just foreign governments.
JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW § 6:1 (2d ed. 2006).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) ("any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ...
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domestic plaintiffs with an antitrust injury to bring suit in the United
States courts, where the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
appropriate. 14
a. An Evolving Standard-Early Cases Attempt to Establish a Standard
for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Antitrust Arena
American courts have long struggled with the applicability of the
Sherman Act to conduct abroad. The first Supreme Court case to
evaluate the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws
was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.15 In American Banana,
the plaintiff company, incorporated in Alabama, sued a company,
incorporated in New Jersey, for price fixing, and as a result of such price
fixing, monopolizing and restraining trade. 16 This was a case of first
impression, as while the parties were both American companies, all of
the claimed damages stemmed from anticompetitive activities outside of
the United States and solely within Panama and Costa Rica. 7
The Supreme Court held that American jurisdiction was improper,
as by nature all laws are territorial and intended only to apply to actors
within the States that enact such laws. 8 Because the plaintiff presented
no evidence that the acts complained of were contrary to the sovereign
laws of Panama and Costa Rica, where the complained-of actions took
place, the court held it was improper to extend extraterritorial juris-
diction.'9 The Court found that there was very little American interest in
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee"); S. Lynn
Diamond, Note, Empagran, the FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects: Guidance to Courts
Facing Questions ofAntitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 805, 840
(2006) (discussing Empagran, and stating that the Supreme Court gave deference to
comity concerns voiced by amici, including various foreign governments who
expressed concern that treble damages "threatened to make the United States the forum
of choice for plaintiffs around the world" and thereby undermining foreign antitrust
laws (internal citations omitted)).
14. See Diamond, supra note 13, at 840 (discussing the attractiveness to plaintiffs
of the possibility of treble damages).
15. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
16. Id. at 354.
17. Id. at 354-55.
18. Id. at 357.
19. Id. at 356 ("For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor,
to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the
acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of
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the actions of the parties over the questioned activity abroad, as all of the
complained-of conduct happened within Panama and Costa Rica and
involved the predicate acts of a sovereign government.20 The Court gave
significant deference to comity concerns-particularly the fact that the
laws of the foreign countries involved did not prohibit the complained-of
conduct.2' However, in reaching this result, the Supreme Court basically
held that American courts could not apply extraterritorial jurisdiction to
any acts in foreign countries, regardless of the impact of said acts on the
United States.22
Other courts, confronted with antitrust claims predicated on foreign
conduct that required interpretation of the American Banana decision,
were quick to distinguish that case. Subsequent courts noted one
important distinguishing factor of American Banana, that the Costa
Rican government, a sovereign state, actually initiated the predicate
conduct alleged to be anticompetitive.23 As such, American Banana did
not have as large of an impact as such an overarching holding would
imply.
24
another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned
justly might resent."). This severely limited the application of U.S. antitrust statutes
solely to conduct occurring within United States territory. However, subsequent cases,
discussed infra, were quick to distinguish American Banana due to its unique factors.
Subsequent court decisions chipped away, and eventually overruled, the Court's
holding. This American Banana holding was, at the time, particularly impactful, as few
countries had antitrust laws in place at the time, and this basically immunized
anticompetitive conduct abroad from suit, regardless of whether such conduct was in
violation of the antitrust laws of the United States and regardless of whether the actors
intended the acts to have an effect on U.S. commerce. See also Stephanie A. Casey,
Comment, Balancing Deterrence, Comity Considerations, and Judicial Efficiency: The
Use of the D.C. Circuit's Proximate Cause Standard for Determining Subject Matter
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Antitrust Cases, AM. U. L. REv. 585, 592 & n.30
(2005).
20. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1909).
21. Id. at 358-59.
22. Id. at 357 (stating "[w]e think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in
Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is
concerned," in finding that the situs of the complained-of acts is the relevant inquiry).
23. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927) (distinguishing
American Banana).
24. Subsequent courts refused to acknowledge that American Banana essentially
prohibited all foreign conduct from falling under Sherman Act jurisdiction. Essentially,
the courts relied on the serious comity concerns that would be implicated if American
courts were to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over actions by a sovereign's
government.
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The narrow approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction of American
Banana was short lived. Less than 20 years later, in United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., the Supreme Court adopted a broader approach and
held conduct only partially within the United States could form the basis
of an antitrust suit and justify the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. In Sisal, companies based in the United States conspired
with Mexican firms to monopolize import of sisal, a plant used to make
rope.26 The Court noted the unique sovereign action at issue in
American Banana and found that case did not control.2" It distinguished
the conduct in Sisal in finding that the United States complained of a
violation of U.S. laws within U.S. territory by parties subject to Sherman
Act jurisdiction, as opposed to the acts of a foreign government at the
instigation of private parties.28 The Court stressed that the conspiracy in
question, while conducted abroad, "brought about forbidden results
within the United States., 29 The Court stated that instead of looking
merely at locality of the complained of conduct and the laws of the
country in which the conduct occurred,3" the proper jurisdictional
analysis requires the court to examine where the effects of the
anticompetitive acts are felt.31 If the effects of the complained-of anti-
competitive acts are felt within the United States, these American effects
are an important factor weighing in favor of the exercise of American
extraterritorial jurisdiction over activities conducted outside of the
sovereign.
3 2
The Court's construction of antitrust extraterritorial jurisdiction in
Sisal was the first in a line of cases that scholars, litigators, and courts
commonly referred to as the "effects doctrine. 33  Furthermore, Sisal
25. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
26. Id. at 271-73.
27. Id. at 275 (noting "[t]he substance of the complaint is that, the plantation being
within the de facto jurisdiction of Costa Rica, that state took and keeps possession of it
by virtue of its sovereign power. But a seizure by a state is not a thing that can be
complained of elsewhere in the courts" (internal citations omitted)).
28. Id. at 276.
29. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust Laws: The United
States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1992).
30. These are the relevant factors enumerated in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
31. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp, 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927).
32. Id.
33. Michael G. Mckinnon, Comment, Federal Judicial and Legislative Jurisdiction
over Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond
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greatly expanded the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.3 4
The trend of widening the extraterritorial application of antitrust
laws continued in the seminal case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America ("Alcoa").35 This case concerned the establishment of a quota
system, devised by European companies, for the export of aluminum to
the United States in order to sustain a price-fixing monopoly held by an
American company.36 Judge Learned Hand, in determining whether the
court should exercise jurisdiction over alleged violations of the Sherman
Act under the circumstances, focused not on the European situs of the
acts.31 Rather, Judge Hand focused where the effects of the harm were
felt. In finding that the court could exercise jurisdiction, and defendants
were potentially liable under the Sherman Act, the Alcoa court extended
the effects doctrine to foreign conduct when the effects of
anticompetitive foreign conduct were felt within the United States.38 In
so holding, the court stated:
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its
courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the
United States .... On the other hand, . . . any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which
the state reprehends .... 39
The Alcoa decision widened the jurisdictional reach of the federal
courts in the antitrust context, 40 repudiated American Banana, widened
the scope of the Sisal Sales Corp. holding as to subject matter
jurisdiction, and held the Sherman Act is applicable in all circumstances
in which the effects of anticompetitive conduct-regardless of where the
harm occurred-were intended to be felt in the United States and were
the Timberlane/Restatement Approach, 21 PEPPERDrNE L. REv. 1219, 1259 n.194
(1994).
34. Id.
35. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
36. Id. at 423-34.
37. Id. at 443-44.
38. Id. at 445 (holding that United States courts have jurisdiction over
anticompetitive conduct, regardless of situs, where the conduct was intended to, and
actually did, harm the United States and U.S. interests).
39. 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. Mckinnon, supra note 33, at 1263-66 (discussing the impact of Judge Hand's
Alcoa decision).
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in fact felt in the United States.41
The Alcoa court found the contracts in question to be subject to
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the antitrust laws, as even though the
parties executed the illegal conduct abroad, the defendants intended to
and did, in fact, have an effect on United States imports. 42 Because the
effects were felt in the United States, the court held that the contacts
with the United States were thus sufficient to establish jurisdiction over
the contracts, even though they were formed extraterritorially.
43
Because the Alcoa test only looks to the effect of anticompetitive
conduct, and does not consider comity concerns, subsequent courts
interpreting Alcoa broadly and expansively applied it.44  Post-Alcoa
decisions paid little attention to traditional comity concerns, and instead
focused on the actual effects of the alleged anticompetitive conduct.45
b. Foreign Responses to Dismissal of the
Comity Rule-of-Reason- Type Analysis
The Alcoa decision sparked an immediate and substantial backlash
in the international community.4 6 Because Alcoa effectively did away
with the comity prong of the extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis, foreign
sovereigns were concerned that the United States would become a world
policeman with the power to overtake global antitrust enforcement to the
detriment of foreign sovereigns' ability to regulate conduct within their
41. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443, 445.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 238 & n.6 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2006) (noting that Alcoa
greatly expanded jurisdiction over suits involving foreign trade and stating through May
1973, the United States filed 249 antitrust suits involving foreign trade, and none were
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (citing WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 498-543, app. B (2d ed. 1973))); Note, Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1452 (1956) (providing a
collection of cases).
45. See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949,
953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that the vital question in determining whether the antitrust
laws apply to any actor, foreign or citizen, is whether such anticompetitive acts affect
trade and commerce within the United States); KESSLER & WALLER, supra note 42, at
238 (stating that in the aftermath of Alcoa, "the courts paid little, if any, attention to
intent").
46. KESSLER & WALLER, supra note 43, at 239. See generally id. at § 6.3.
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borders.47  While American Banana strongly favored international
comity in holding that foreign conduct would never be subject to U.S.
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, Alcoa represented a marked change
in United States courts' evaluation of conduct abroad.48 It seemed
American courts were no longer concerned about their potential to
interfere with foreign sovereignty interests, as the Alcoa test merely
requires the consequences of anticompetitive acts that are illegal under
the Sherman Act be felt in the United States, and that such consequences
are those which the state reprehends.49
Foreign governments and scholars criticized what many saw as
potentially harsh results of the Alcoa decision.50 To protect the interests
of their own citizens and corporations, many foreign states adopted
foreign blocking statutes.5" These blocking statutes varied from country
to country and covered various aspects of foreign judgments and
enforcements.52 A representative foreign blocking statute includes the
47. Won-Ki Kim, The Extraterritorial Application of US. Antitrust Law and Its
Adoption in Korea, 7 SING. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 386, 390 (2003) (noting the substantial
foreign backlash)
48. JOELSON, supra note 11, at 38 (remarking that Alcoa was a landmark case and
noting that after Alcoa, neither the nationality of the wrongdoer nor the locale of the
activity are irrelevant as long as the intent and effect are demonstrable, whereas, under
American Banana, the locale of the activity was the most important factor in
determining whether to assert jurisdiction).
49. Id.
50. Alford, supra note 29, at 10.
51. For example, in 1947, the United States was conducting a Sherman Act
investigation of the Canadian newsprint industry. Jim Walden & Matthew Benjamin,
Going It Alone: The Costs of Unilateral Law Enforcement, 15(10) Bus. CRIMES BULL.,
June 2008. A federal court subpoenaed 50 Canadian companies to provide documents
relevant to the investigation. Id. The Canadian government balked at this request, and
after a negotiation between American and Canadian officials, the subpoenas were
dropped, but the possibility of them was not forgotten. Id. The Province of Ontario
adopted the first criminal foreign blocking statute entitled the Business Records
Protection Act. Id. Other nations, including Great Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, and
Australia, followed suit in the 1950s and 1970s during a U.S. investigation into
petroleum and uranium cartels. Id. While initially intended to block criminal
investigations of anticompetitive behavior, the effects of the blocking statutes spilled
over to the civil arena, wherein defendants used them as a shield to discovery requests
in civil cases. Id.
52. These blocking statutes typically include authority for a government minister to
direct noncompliance by persons in the country who received discovery requests
emanating from foreign proceedings; a declaration that United States judgments were to
be deemed unenforceable; and statutory authority enabling a party who had made
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imposition of civil, or even criminal, sanctions on a foreign defendant
who cooperates with the discovery process in United States litigation
involving the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. These blocking
statutes also may include language that makes it more difficult for
successful plaintiffs to enforce judgments obtained in an American court
abroad. The message to the American courts was clear-foreign nations
with blocking statutes would not allow "perceived abuses in the
application of United States antitrust laws. 53  Foreign countries with
blocking statutes, whose leaders felt the United States courts were
overextending their jurisdiction and disregarding comity concerns,
attempted to use the blocking statues to make it very difficult for
plaintiffs in the United States to obtain discovery or to enforce any
judgments.54 Without adequate discovery, it was difficult for any case
that required foreign discovery to proceed beyond the pleadings stage."
Additionally, without being able to enforce a judgment, plaintiffs had
little incentive to bring suit.
To the disappointment of foreign nations, blocking statutes
remained largely ineffective. Courts generally viewed blocking statutes
as "sham laws designed to afford litigants tactical weapons and
bargaining chips in foreign courts. ' 56 In the face of these foreign
blocking statutes, American courts continued to subject foreign entities
payment under a U.S. antitrust treble damage award to sue to recover the portion of the
damages which exceeded single damages (otherwise known as "clawback" provisions).
JOELSON, supra note 11, at 70.
53. Walden & Benjamin, supra note 51 (internal quotations omitted).
54. See, e.g., In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(holding that where disclosure of information with regard to deposits and transactions
of a Cuban branch of a bank by way of subpoena duces tecum would violate Cuban law
subjecting some agents of the bank to criminal penalties in Cuba, it was improper for
the U.S. court to subpoena those documents).
55. This is true because discovery is the process whereby each party to a case
learns the evidence the opposing side is privy to. LARRY J. SIEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 444 (12th ed. 2008).
56. Walden & Benjamin, supra note 51. See also United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding it proper to hold a German bank in
contempt where it elected to not comply with a subpoena requesting certain documents
during an antitrust investigation, regardless of the fact that producing the requested
documents would subject the bank to civil liability in Germany); see generally Donald
L. Roth, Note, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign Jurisdiction Where Law of
Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 295 (1962) (discussing the situations in
which production of documents located abroad is and is not barred through the
application of foreign blocking statutes).
IN THE WAKE OF EMPAGRAN
to court-ordered discovery, even in the face of civil or criminal sanctions
for the defendants in their sovereigns.57 While foreign states adopted
elements of their foreign blocking statutes, such as barriers to judgment
enforcement, which may have been initially effective in rendering
foreign companies judgment proof, in today's global marketplace, many
actors that are found to be in violation of antitrust laws have assets in the
United States, which plaintiffs may seek to attach in satisfaction of
judgments-effectively avoiding the barriers presented in the foreign
blocking statutes. 8
c. Courts Respond to Criticisms ofAlcoa
Perhaps in response to domestic and foreign criticism, foreign
blocking statutes, or the harsh consequences of the pure effects doctrine,
at least one court found the scope of Alcoa was limited. In Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted what came to be known as the "rule-of-reason" test.59
The Timberlane court revisited some of the Supreme Court's consid-
erations in American Banana,60 and took the bite off of the pure effects
test in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The rule-of-reason test
takes international comity into account when determining whether to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The Timberlane court outlined three factors that courts should
consider in determinations of the proper exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. First, the Timberlane test determines whether the alleged
restraint of trade has some actual or intended effect on American foreign
commerce. Second, it asks whether that anticompetitive effect is
sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and,
therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws.62 Third, the final prong
57. First Nat ' City Bank, 396 F.2d 897; Walden & Benjamin, supra note 51; Roth,
supra note 56.
58. See generally David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and
Arbitral Awards in the United States, West Germany, and England, 19 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 325, 329 (1987).
59. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976).
60. Id. at 605.
61. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
593 (3d ed. 1996). This prong integrates the "effects test" enunciated by the Second
Circuit in Alcoa.
62. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
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of the test requires the interest of, and links to, the United States to be
sufficiently strong vis-A-vis those of other nations to justify an assertion
of American extraterritorial authority.63
The first prong of the test is similar to the effects doctrine
enunciated in Alcoa. The second prong is a type of proximate cause
inquiry.64  The third prong of the Timberlane rule-of-reason test
reconsiders international comity, trends away from the expansion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the antitrust context, and rolls back the
impact of Alcoa. The Court outlined specific factors that should be
considered and weighed in the third prong of the test:
1.The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2.The nationality, location, and principal places of business of the
parties;
3.The extent to which enforcement by either state can achieve
compliance;
4.The relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere;
5.The existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce;
6.The foreseeability of such effect; and
7.The relative importance of the conduct to the United States as
compared with the conduct abroad.
65
The Timberlane rule-of-reason test received positive responses
from scholars and placated critics of the Alcoa "effects doctrine."66 The
rule-of-reason test purports to consider various factors of international
comity under the third prong. Some, but not all, circuit courts adopted
the Ninth Circuit's approach.67
In practice, in virtually every case wherein U.S. courts applied the
63. Id.
64. In that it requires that the harm to have caused substantial injury to the
plaintiffs. It is in this way similar to the second prong of the FTAIA test which calls for
proximate cause inquiry by the court to sustain a claim. See discussion infra, at Section
III.
65. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614-15.
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 403, 415.
67. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979) (adding three additional prongs for consideration); but see Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nat'l Bank of Can. v.
Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (adopting a variation of the Alcoa test).
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rule-of-reason test, the court found that if the first two prongs were
satisfied, the third-prong comity analysis almost always tipped in favor
of asserting jurisdiction over the foreign entity--except where the court
found no cognizable adverse impact on U.S. competition interests
whatsoever. 68  Even though it placated critics of the effects doctrine,
Timberlane did not fully resolve conflicting views about the extent to
which determinations as to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
implicated comity concerns. While the Ninth Circuit and other Courts
of Appeals utilized the comity analysis outlined in Timberlane, some
Circuits continued to resist such in-depth inquiries into these comity
concerns.
d. Congress Responds to Confusion and Foreign Outcr1y by
Adopting Amendment to the Antitrust Acts
In 1982, Congress amended the Sherman Act and other antitrust
statutes, in an attempt to reconcile the circuit courts' various inter-
pretations of the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws. The goal was
to offer American exporters clarity about their legal obligations when
conducting business abroad.69
Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982, known as the "FTAIA," in conjunction with the Export Trading
Act of 1982.70 The FTAIA excepted foreign commerce from the reach
of the Sherman Act, absent one exception-conduct with a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effect on domestic commerce,
68. See, e.g., Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 507 F. Supp. 1113
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (using the Timberlane three-prong test to find jurisdiction proper); but
see Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (1981) (finding jurisdiction is
improper where the plaintiff has not shown more than a speculative and insubstantial
effect on United States commerce of a refusal by Canadian subsidiaries to sell Canadian
potash to a Canadian company, at least a part of which was for resale to buyers in North
Korea, where resale to North Korea of American products was prohibited).
69. See generally Export Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233; A
Bill to Amend the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act to Exclude from the Application of
Such Certain Acts Certain Conduct Involving Exports: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary (June 17, 1981). Other nations did not have as extensive antitrust laws
and, to be safe from antitrust scrutiny, many American companies operated within the
American antitrust guidelines, putting them at a disadvantage abroad, as foreign
companies were not subject to as strict competition legislation. Id.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006) (as it applies to extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act); Export Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233.
2010 819
820 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LA W
import commerce, or a domestic firm competing in foreign trade. 7' The
FTAIA applies, for example, in those circumstances where a cartel of
foreign enterprises or a foreign monopolist reaches the American market
through any mechanism, including an intermediary, as well as where
foreign vertical restrictions have an anticompetitive effect felt in the
United States or by American companies engaged in international
commerce.
72
However, the FTAIA exceptions under Section 6a were vague
enough to cause considerable confusion regarding its application in the
courts, culminating in the 2004 Supreme Court decision in F. Hoffmann-
LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A..7 One source of confusion was the
extent to which courts should consider comity in those cases where the
FTAIA applies.
II. CURRENT STATE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CONDUCT
The Ninth Circuit, which issued the influential Timberlane
decision, revisited the issue of the comity prong of the analysis after the
adoption of the FTAIA. A California district court decision, In re
Insurance Antitrust Litigation, dismissed an antitrust challenge to an
agreement among London-based insurers regarding the type and
language of certain insurance coverage offered in the United States.
74
The District Court applied the Timberlane analysis and held that the
court did not have jurisdiction. In the California insurance action, there
was a significant conflict with foreign law and policy due to the highly-
regulated nature of the insurance industry in Great Britain. 7" The district
court, applying the reasoning of the British Government's amicus curiae
brief, stated that international comity compelled the dismissal, as
allowing it to proceed would substantially harm British sovereign
interests, particularly Great Britain's ability to regulate its own insurance
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing the standard).
73. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
74. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
75. Id. (also finding the location of evidence abroad, the attitude of the United
Kingdom toward United States antitrust law, and the existence of a British blocking law
designed to thwart the discovery, trial and execution of judgments in United States
antitrust litigation).
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industry.
76
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the FTAIA "direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable test," and reversed. The appellate court held
that courts could only consider comity in an unusual case, because the
FTAIA specifically outlined the factors to be considered in exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction.77 The Ninth Circuit considered the conflict
with British law and policy, but found that the other factors were more
significant-specifically, the evidence of the foreign parties' intent and
the magnitude of the effects felt within the United States.78
Perhaps as a result of the confusion surrounding the exceptions
under FTAIA, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California7 9 to resolve the issue of what weight courts
should give to comity concerns in determining whether an American
court may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.8" The majority of the
Court took a broad view of extraterritoriality and a narrow view of when
a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds of comity.
The Court stated that courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction by
reason of comity only where a "true conflict" exits. 81 By so holding, the
Court effectively rendered the third-prong considerations in Timberlane
76. See, e.g., Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Cal. 10-15, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (arguing that the district court correctly held, relying
on British amicus curiae that enforcement of antitrust laws against activities in the
London reinsurance market would lead to significant conflict with English law and
policy as well as European Community laws and that reason alone is sufficient to justify
denial of jurisdiction under the Timberlane test and the FTAIA).
77. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) ("it is only in
an unusual case that comity will require abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction").
78. Id. at 933 (effects) & 934 (foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce).
79. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
80. Id. (stating that a court should only decline jurisdiction on the basis of comity
concerns where a "true conflict" exists, that is where enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws
would cause the party contesting jurisdiction to in fact violate a law of another
jurisdiction wherein such law applies to the party).
81. Id, at 796 (holding that "it is well established by now that the Sherman Act
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States"). Justice Scalia authored the dissent and argued
that "conflict" should be defined as in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953),
that is "to apply only to areas and transactions in which American law would be
considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law." Hartford Fire,
509 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted, emphasis in
original).
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null and void. 82
The Hartford Fire test essentially repealed the Timberlane
approach83 and endorsed a version of the Alcoa intended effects
doctrine, essentially ignoring comity outside of the "true conflict" test.
84
However, even after the Supreme Court's Hartford Fire, decision, the
Ninth Circuit continued to utilize the Timberlane multi-factor comity
analysis.85
A look at the procedures of the Department of Justice (the "DOJ")
helps to illustrate the state of the law leading up to the 2004 Supreme
Court case, F. Hoffinann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. In 1995, the
DOJ, in conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC"),
adopted new antitrust enforcement guidelines, the Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, indicating the U.S. govern-
ment's intent to prosecute domestic and foreign anticompetitive conduct
in the context of the Hartford Fire test. 86 These antitrust guidelines
stated the intent of the DOJ to prosecute any anticompetitive conduct
that "affects U.S. domestic or foreign commerce or that may violate the
U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct occurs or the
nationality of the parties involved., 8 7  The guidelines also consider
comity concerns, though they make clear that no conflict exists for the
purposes of the comity analysis where the person subject to regulation
by two states can in fact comply with both. 88
After Hartford Fire, some courts failed to embrace fully the
Supreme Court's decision regarding conflict with foreign national law.
Thus the Supreme Court granted certiorari in F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.89
Empagran is the Court's most recent attempt to address the issue of
82. Compare Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976) (7-step comity analysis), with Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764 ("true
conflict" test).
83. See id. at 798-99 (stating that "[n]o conflict exists, for these purposes, where a
person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both").
84. KESSLER & WALLER, supra note 12, at § 6:8.
85. See, e.g., Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996).
86. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 2.
87. Id. at § 3.10 (noting that jurisdiction over cases involving foreign import
commerce is covered under Hartford Fire and that the FTAIA applies to foreign
conduct other than imports).
88. Id. at § 3.2 (thus reciting the "true conflict" definition embodied in Hartford
Fire).
89. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the antitrust context. The
Court sought to address the confusion surrounding the FTAIA
provisions regarding the reach of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In
Empagran, the Court held that where foreign plaintiffs alleged a global
conspiracy that resulted in wholly foreign effects, the contacts with the
United States were not "direct, substantial and foreseeable," and,
therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction over the claims. 90 The
specific holding was that in cases where alleged anticompetitive conduct
causes independent foreign harm, and where that foreign harm alone
gives rise to the plaintiff's claim, those actors are not subject to juris-
diction under the Sherman Act.91 The Supreme Court took issue with
the facts of the case under the FTAIA exclusion, as the anticompetitive
conduct alleged in the one instance resulted in solely foreign injury, and,
therefore, both the language of the FTAIA and comity counseled against
application of the Sherman Act to those claims.92
In Empagran, both foreign and domestic plaintiffs sued under the
Sherman Act for price fixing.93 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that as
a result of the price fixing vitamin prices were elevated both in the
United States and in various other countries. 94 The foreign plaintiffs did
not allege that they made any purchases in the United States or were
involved in United States commerce in any way-they made all
purchases abroad.95 Instead, they alleged that because there was some
domestic harm as a result of the foreign conduct, the FTAIA did not
exclude the plaintiffs from bringing suit in a U.S. court.96 The D.C.
Circuit, in the initial case ("Empagran 1"), held that the plaintiffs
pleaded sufficient facts for the court to establish subject matter
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.97 The circuit court recognized
the split that developed in the wake of the adoption of the FTAIA in
regard to causation and statutory interpretation. 98 Nonetheless, the D.C.
90. Id. at 169.
91. Id. at 166.
92. Id. at 169.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 159.
95. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 160 (2004).
96. Id.
97. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("Empagran ').
98. Compare Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing a
less restrictive interpretation of the FTAIA that does not require proximate causation),
with Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001)
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Circuit sided with the more flexible interpretation adopted by the Second
Circuit, which did not require proximate causation, merely that "where
the anticompetitive conduct has the requisite effect on United States
commerce, FTAIA permits suits by foreign plaintiffs who are injured
solely by that conduct's effect on foreign commerce." 99
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split as
to whether, when the foreign harm was separate from the domestic
harm, a foreign plaintiff, who only felt the foreign harm, could bring
suit.1 0 The Empagran Court concluded that where the foreign harm was
wholly separate from the domestic harm, the court must dismiss the suit
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'
The Court justified its holding on two grounds. First, the Court
looked at the purpose behind the application of American antitrust laws
to foreign conduct. The Court found that application of American anti-
trust laws to foreign conduct was reasonable and consistent with
principles of prescriptive comity,102 insofar as such application is in an
effort to redress domestic injury. 03 The Court further noted, however,
the potential for serious risk of interference with a foreign nation's
ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs. 10 4 The
Court expressed concern that allowing such suits (those which involve
wholly foreign harm) would open a floodgate, wherein a foreign
plaintiff could sue in American courts for wholly foreign conduct by
simply noting an unnamed third party in the United States who could
also potentially and theoretically state a cause of action. °5 The Court
noted the difference in damages remedies available to plaintiffs who
prove anticompetitive conduct-the United States provides for treble
damages in private causes of action-has caused significant controversy
(requiring proximate cause between effects felt in the United States and the injury to the
plaintiffs).
99. Empagran I, 315 F.3d at 341; Kruman, 284 F.3d 384.
100. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 160-61.
101. Id. at 166.
102. Prescriptive comity means "the respect sovereign nations afford each other by
limiting the reach of their laws." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817
(1993).
103. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (citing
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 166 (citing P. AREDA & H. HOvENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 273, pp. 51-
52 (Supp. 2003)). This particular concern was embodied in Empagran, where the Court
properly separated the domestic and foreign suits.
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in the international community. The Court reasoned that serious comity
concerns would arise if the Court were to hold that foreign plaintiffs
may properly bring a claim alleging solely foreign injuries under the
American antitrust laws. 106
Second, the Court evaluated the language and history of the FTAIA
and found that both suggested that Congress designed the FTAIA to
clarify, rather than expand, the contemporaneous exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. 10 7  The Court
scrutinized several cases decided prior to the enactment of the FTAIA,
which the Empagran plaintiffs argued indicated that the Court should
find that suit should proceed under the Sherman Act, even where the
harm is totally foreign. However, the Court distinguished all three cases
and found that no pre-1982 (i.e., pre-FTAIA) case supported the
application of the Sherman Act to the harm alleged in Empagran.'°8
Additionally, the Court found significant support in Timberlane, which
was decided pre-FTAIA, for the Ninth Circuit's insistence that the
foreign conduct's domestic effect be sufficiently large to present a
cognizable injury to the plaintiffs, seemingly requiring that the domestic
effect must be proximately causally related to the plaintiffs' injuries. 109
Given both the comity concerns and the absence of evidence that
Congress intended such harms to be covered under the Sherman Act, the
Court found no support for the contention that subject matter jurisdiction
could be established where the anticompetitive conduct independently
caused foreign injury. "0 The Court then remanded to the D.C. Circuit to
make a determination on the plaintiffs' alternate argument-that the
foreign injury was not independent, in that the anticompetitive conduct's
domestic effects were linked to the foreign harm."1
106. Id. at 169.
107. Id. at 169.
108. Id. at 171-73 (distinguishing three cases cited by respondents brought by
private plaintiffs prior to the enactment of the FTAIA and rejecting respondent's
argument the FTAIA was enacted under the assumption that wholly foreign harm could
fall under the reach of U.S. antitrust laws and therefore did not intend to limit such
suits).
109. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173 (2004) (citing
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1976)).
110. Id. at 175. It is important to note that in the Empagran case, the plaintiffs
alleged only independent foreign harm, separate and different from the harm felt in the
United States.
111. Id. (the plaintiffs argued that this "but-for" condition was sufficient to bring the
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On remand, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the plaintiffs' alternative argument, that but for the worldwide
price fixing, which required that U.S. corporations sell vitamins at
elevated price to sustain the conspiracy, the foreign plaintiffs would not
have suffered harm, because they would have been able to purchase the
vitamins in the United States at lower prices and sell them abroad
(thereby acting as arbitrageurs). 1 2  The circuit court held that
"proximate cause" between the domestic effect and foreign injury must
exist for such conduct to fall under the FTAIA exception. 13 The court
noted that plaintiffs could establish sufficient proximate causation for
purposes of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction if the increased
prices in the United States proximately caused the foreign appellants'
injuries. However, the plaintiffs failed to show that their injuries abroad
were "inextricably bound up with domestic restraints of trade;" and,
therefore, the case was properly dismissed. 
114
III. ANALYSIS-WHAT DOES EMPAGRAN MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN ANTITRUST INJURY
The Supreme Court, in Empagran, indicated that there were some
circumstances in which foreign plaintiffs may bring suit under the
FTAIA exception for foreign harm. 5 The Court, however, declined to
hear the petition of the Empagran plaintiffs who unsuccessfully argued
price-fixing conduct under the scope of the FTAIA exception, however the Supreme
Court did not address the issue of whether but-for causation was sufficient to fall under
the exception).
112. The plaintiffs argued that because the defendants' product was fungible and
globally marketed, they were able to sustain super-competitive prices abroad only by
maintaining super-competitive prices in the United States as well. Plaintiffs argued that
unless prices were the same worldwide, arbitrageurs would purchase vitamins in bulk
and resell them internationally, thus eventually evening out the market. Therefore, the
plaintiffs argued, that the super-competitive pricing in the United States gave rise to the
injuries to the foreign plaintiffs (the super-competitive prices). Appellants' Brief at 15-
21, Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005), on
remandfrom 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
113. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
114. Id. at 1271.
115. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 156 (noting that it is widely accepted that jurisdiction in
antitrust cases can be extended to foreign conduct "insofar as the laws reflect a
legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury caused by foreign anticompetitive
conduct").
IN THE WAKE OF EMPAGRAN
in the Court of Appeals, on remand, that but-for causation was sufficient
to establish the extraterritorial application of jurisdiction under the
FTAIA exception.1 16 Several federal district courts have adopted the
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Empagran 11, rejecting but-for
causation, when presented with substantially factually similar cases.
Factual parallels include alleged global conspiracies, wherein the
causation standard was that absent a global conspiracy, arbitrageurs
would be able to operate in the market for a particular good or service.
Few other Courts of Appeals have ruled on this alternative causation
theory argument." 7  It remains an open question as to which
circumstances satisfy the requisite proximate causal relationship a
foreign plaintiff must prove under the FTAIA to state a claim for relief
under the Sherman Act, and in which circumstances actors engaged in
foreign conduct may be susceptible to suit under the Sherman Act in
U.S. courts.
a. Jurisdictional Causation in Civil Cases, a
Prevailing Standard Post-Empagran
Proponents of a but-for causation standard express concern
regarding the possibility of under-deterrence of global cartel activity. If
courts continue to require proximate cause under the FTAIA
exception, 18 they argue, courts are placing excessive emphasis on
comity. Indeed, the purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect against
anticompetitive conduct. Congress is presumed to pass laws for the
purpose of benefitting those citizens for whom it was adopted-in the
116. Empagran 11, 417 F.3d at 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092
(2006).
117. See, e.g., In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. OOMDL1328,
2005 WL 2810682 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005) (finding that the D.C. Circuit's reasoning
persuasive and as the plaintiffs put forth the exact same argument as the plaintiffs in
Empagran-that otherwise arbitrageurs would have corrected the prices absent the
worldwide conspiracy-it should be dismissed); eMag Solutions LLC V. Toda Kogyo
Corp., No. C 02-1611 PJH, 2005 WL 1712084 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2005) (same);
Latinoquimica Amtex v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, B.V., No. 03 Civ. 10312, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19788 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005) (same). But see Snaido v. Bank Austria
AG, 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004). The D.C. Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit are the
only circuit courts to rule on this issue and all require proximate cause. See discussion
infra.
118. Victor P. Goldberg, Comment, The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois
Brick and a Hard Place, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 785, 792-93 (2009).
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case of antitrust legislation, American harms and effects. Courts and
Congress have delicately balanced various interests in the path to current
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.
Contrary to the claims of critics, global cartels are still subject to
Sherman Act jurisdiction, where these cartels harm American consumers
or where the harm felt by any plaintiff has a sufficient causal
relationship to the effects in the United States.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Empagran, certain plaintiffs
attempted to argue that there has been some split regarding the
appropriate causation standard in cases factually similar to Empagran II,
in an attempt to convince courts to adopt a but-for causation standard. " 9
While most circuits have followed the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, 120 it
some plaintiffs and scholars have argued that at least one federal district
court allowed a foreign damages-based claim to go forward resting on
the same general argument as the Empagran II plaintiffs. 2 ' However, as
discussed below, this case is not as factually similar as plaintiffs
attempting to advance this argument would have a court believe.
In MM Global Services, Inc., the plaintiffs argued that Dow and
Union Carbide were involved in a global price-fixing conspiracy. 22 The
plaintiffs alleged that "as a direct and proximate result of the defendants'
fixing of minimum resale prices and other terms of sale, competition in
the sale and resale of Union Carbide products in and from the United
States was improperly diminished and restrained."' 123  The defendants
119. See, e.g., Appellees' Joint Answering Brief, In re Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2006) (arguing that
MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co. allowed a claim to proceed that merely
stated but-for causation).
120. Michelle A. Wyant, Reconsidering the D.C. Circuit's Proximate Cause
Standard for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Precluding the "Globalization" Theory to
Promote Global Enforcement, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 15, 18 (2008) (stating that
the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard has become the prevailing standard to
establish subject matter jurisdiction post-Empagran).
121. See MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337, 339 (D.
Conn. 2004).
122. Id. at 340. Plaintiffs alleged that Union Carbide directly and through their
affiliates forced the plaintiffs to engage in a price maintenance conspiracy by with
respect to the resale of Union Carbide products in India. Id. Plaintiffs further alleged
that both Union Carbide and Dow refused to accept orders or cancelled orders if the
prospective resale prices for end users in India fell below certain levels in an effort to
maintain prices at a certain level. Id.
123. Id. at 340 (quoting the Amended Complaint).
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moved to dismiss the antitrust claim for a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the
defendant's misconduct gave rise to antitrust effects in the United States
that injured the plaintiffs, as required under the FTAIA and subsequent
to the holding in Empagran.
124
The court disagreed with the defendants. In finding for plaintiffs,
the court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss, as they properly alleged that the defendants' conduct
had an effect on competition "in and from the United States and the
plaintiffs were injured as a result of that effect."' 125 The plaintiffs alleged
that,
[a]s a direct and proximate result of the defendants' fixing of
minimum resale prices and other terms of sale, competition in the
sale and resale of products in and from the United States was
improperly diminished and restrained, and as a result of such effect
on competition, the plaintiffs were injured by being precluded from
effectively and fully competing and maximizing their sales of
products. 1
26
The court held that it was not inconceivable that domestic effects
can give rise to both injuries to plaintiffs and affect domestic commerce
and thereby rejected the defendant's defense of lack of jurisdiction and
allowed the case to proceed. Plaintiffs have argued that in MM Global
Services, the Court implicitly adopted a but-for causation test,
representing an alternative to, and departure from, those courts that
required proximate cause.
Subsequent cases interpreting MM Global Services in other
jurisdictions have limited its value as precedent to the specific facts in
that case. The later cases noted the MM Global Services plaintiffs made
their purchases within the United States, and that, as such, the court did
not directly rule on but-for causation. Moreover, and perhaps most
importantly, MM Global Services preceded Empagran H.
The D.C. Circuit's standard of causation has properly become the
prevailing standard for the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
the antitrust context. This standard balances comity while still pro-
tecting the public from illegal conduct that has harmful domestic effects.
124. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A.,
542 U.S. 155 (2004)).
125. Id. at 342.
126. Id.
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This proximate cause standard has become, and will remain, the
prevailing standard for the following three reasons. First, the history of
the enactment of the FTAIA and the plain language of the statute
indicate that proximate cause is required to establish jurisdiction in these
types of suits. Second, the D.C. Circuit correctly held that implementing
the Empagran plaintiffs' alternative argument would harmfully
implicate comity concerns. Third, no court post-Empagran II has
permitted exercise of jurisdiction over claims that stated merely but-for
causation, despite some flawed arguments to the contrary.
The History of the Enactment of the FTAIA and the
Plain Language of the Statute Indicate That Proximate Cause Is
Requiredfor the Application of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Those
Cases Where There Is a Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably
Foreseeable Effect on U.S. Commerce
Commentators in the wake of the Supreme Court's holding in
Empagran predicted a new circuit split on the issue of whether but-for
causation is sufficient to state a claim under the FTAIA exception.
However, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia correctly
noted, the legislative history of the FTAIA and the plain language of the
statute require a proximate causation standard. No courts have dis-
agreed with the D.C. Circuit on this point thus far.
At the time that the FTAIA was enacted by Congress, there was a
circuit split regarding the importance of comity concerns in applying
subject matter jurisdiction to foreign conduct. The FTAIA was enacted
in 1982 in conjunction with the Export Trading Act of 1982. The
purpose of the Act was to "aid the efforts of American business to
compete vigorously and effectively throughout the world."' 127  The
primary purpose of the Act was to protect American companies who
were engaging in export activities from the scrutiny of American anti-
trust laws when conducting activities abroad. Because American
antitrust laws are more restrictive than many competition laws in other
127. A Bill to Amend the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act to Exclude from the
Application of Such Certain Acts Certain Conduct Involving Exports: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (June 17, 1981) [hereinafter FTAIA Hearing] (prepared
statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). See also id.
(statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, DOJ)
(stating that the purpose of the FTAIA is to reduce confusion regarding the application
of antitrust laws to export activities).
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countries, American companies were often at a disadvantage to their
foreign counterparts, who were not subject to U.S. antitrust laws when
conducting business abroad. In discussing the Act, Congress stated that
in order to determine whether U.S. antitrust laws should apply to foreign
conduct "[t]here must be a threshold determination that the conduct has
the requisite direct and substantial effect on commerce in [the United
States].' 12' However, Congress did not intend to prohibit all suits
regarding foreign conduct, as it considered, and rejected, bills that would
more explicitly and expansively limit the reach of extraterritorial
jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust laws. 129
In discussing the FTAIA, Congress heard testimony before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary in which some expressed concern
that the FTAIA did not require the anticompetitive act to occur within
the United States for extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply, acknowledging
that such a circumstance could exist. 3 ° Additionally, Congress ac-
knowledged that the Supreme Court had not at the time of adoption,
resolved the Circuit split regarding the importance of a comity
analysis.13' In the face of these considerations, Congress adopted a test
which requires a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effect
on United States commerce to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction in
antitrust cases--creating a jurisdictional nexus requirement which does
not take into consideration comity concerns on its face.' 32 However, the
FTAIA recognizes the growing effects of foreign state antitrust laws and
restrictions, excluding from the reach of the Sherman Act those
transactions and events that solely have consequences abroad.' 3
Congress closely scrutinized those transactions and events that have a
128. FTAIA Hearing, supra note 128, at 2 (prepared statement of Sen. Strom
Thurmond, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). This standard evolved into the
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable language adopted by Congress in the
FTAIA.
129. See generally FTAIA Hearing, supra note 128.
130. Id. at 34 (statement of Joel Davidow, Former Chief, Foreign Commerce
Section, Antitrust Division, DOJ).
131. Id. at 40-41 (prepared statement of Robert Pitofsky, former Comm'r, FTC).
132. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust Laws: The United
States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (1992) (noting
that the author believes that after the adoption of the FTAIA, there exists a two-tiered
approach to the extension of antitrust laws to foreign conduct, first whether there is a
sufficient jurisdictional nexus and second, whether jurisdiction should be exercised after
consideration of international comity concerns, as elucidated in Timberlane).
133. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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"direct and substantial effect" felt in the United States. 3 4 While the
FTAIA makes no specific reference to a causation standard between the
direct and substantial effect and any particular harmed party, the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended a proximate
relationship in section 6a of the Act.
In particular, in relation to foreign cartels, the legislative history
specifically submits that there should be no question that antitrust laws
cover international cartel activity.'35 Because the legislative history of
the enactment of the FTAIA indicates that Congress had no intention to
affect current case law and no relevant pre-1982 case allowed for the
assertion of subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign plaintiff where
merely but-for causation was present, Congress clearly intended that
wholly foreign conduct as well as conduct that results in harm that has
only a tenuous connection to U.S. commerce be excluded from coverage
under the FTAIA.
The language of the FTAIA also supports the contention that
Congress intended a proximate cause standard. The statute states that
conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations shall not
come under the umbrella of Sherman Act enforcement actions unless
two conditions are met. First, such conduct must have a direct, sub-
stantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, and
second, such effect must give rise to a claim.136 The general controversy
surrounding the interpretation of the FTAIA statute is the use of the
words "a claim," as opposed to the clearer "the claim." The argument is
that "a claim" in the statutory language means, not only the suing
plaintiffs claim, but any claim that may be asserted. If that definition is
to be accepted then proximate cause is not required. However, as the
D.C. Circuit correctly held, the use of"a claim" is sufficient to show that
proximate cause is required. In making this determination, the D.C.
Circuit noted that the legislative history of the FTAIA makes clear that
the domestic effects requirement "does not exclude all persons injured
134. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
135. FTAIA Hearing, supra note 128, at 47 (prepared statement of Robert Pitofsky,
former Comm'r, FTC).
[T]here is no debate that the antitrust laws should cover international cartel activity
that affects U.S. markets-for example, a world-wide division of markets between
U.S. and foreign companies that operates to exclude foreign companies from the U.S.
market-and to be absolutely certain on this point, the legislative history probably
should say so.
Id.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l) to (2) (2006).
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abroad from recovering under the antitrust laws of the United States."' 3 7
However, as the D.C. Circuit correctly determined, the plain
construction of Section 6a of the Sherman Act requires that the harmful
effect specified in Section 6a(1) "gives rise to" a claim, indicating a
direct causal relationship. Proximate cause generally defined is "a cause
that directly produces an event and without which the event would not
have occurred."' Therefore, the most obvious construction of the
statutory language is that proximate cause is required. The use of the
article "a" instead of "the" is inconsequential in the context of the
overall language of the statute.
Further, the use of the language "a claim" is, at most, ambiguous
and courts must construe ambiguous statutes to avoid "unreasonable
interference with the sovereign authority of other nations." 139  To
interpret the statute to mean that merely but-for causation is required
would allow American antitrust law to supplant the laws of other
nations.' 40 As laws of construction require the opposite result, the
proper interpretation of Section 6a requires proximate causation.
As indicated by the D.C. Circuit in Empagran II, proximate cause is
the proper test as but-for causation harmfully implicates comity
concerns. The D.C. Circuit in Empagran, on remand from the Supreme
Court, determined that proximate cause was required to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the Empagran defendants. The D.C.
Circuit further stated that such a requirement was in accordance with
principles of comity as to allow for but-for causation would "open the
door to . . . interference with other nations' prerogative to safeguard
their own citizens from anti-competitive activity within their own
borders.' 41
This is true because but-for causation would allow U.S. courts to
assert jurisdiction over foreign conduct where such conduct has merely
tenuous conducts with the United States. As was demonstrated in the
aftermath of the broad Alcoa decision, foreign states resent overarching
exercises of jurisdiction of U.S. courts over conduct within their nations.
Arguably, an expansion of the FTAIA exception to require only but-for
137. Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 417 F.3d 1267, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 17a).
138. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th ed. 2009).
139. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
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causation would go beyond even the controversial holding in Alcoa.
b. Courts Have Consistently Held That Proximate Cause Is
Required to Establish Jurisdiction under the FTAIA Exception and
Cases Cited for the Proposition That But-For Causation Is
Sufficient Are Improperly Applied
The current trend at the appellate level indicates that foreign
plaintiffs are extremely limited in those cases in which they can bring
before United States federal courts for violations of U.S. antitrust
laws. 142 Despite some early indication that a circuit split would result
from the Supreme Court's decision in Empagran regarding the causation
standard required under the FTAIA, the trend in recent cases indicates
that proximate cause connecting the "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce and the alleged antitrust
injury is required. First and foremost, every Circuit Court that has ruled
on the issue of causation standards as to extraterritoriality under the
FTAIA since the D.C. Circuit's holding in Empagran II has held that
proximate cause is the requisite standard. 1
43
Some plaintiffs have attempted to argue that cases after Empagran
H have adopted a but-for causation standard under the FTAIA.'44 These
arguments are without merit and courts post Empagran II have
universally rejected them.'45
142. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d
981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (adopting proximate cause requirement under the second prong
of the FTAIA exception where all purchases were made outside of the United States
and the plaintiffs acknowledged they could bring suit in the United Kingdom); In re
Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 539-40 (8th Cir. 2007)
(requiring a proximate causal relationship between the domestic effect and the harm felt
by plaintiffs); Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 417 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (same).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In Boyd,
the plaintiff U.S. wheat farmers brought suit against an Australian agricultural
distributor and its American subsidiary for actions in furtherance of monopolizing the
market for wheat in Iraq to the foreclosure of U.S.-grown wheat in the Iraqi market. Id.
at 244-45. The court held that "although plaintiffs may have alleged a plausible theory
of causation based on the global interrelatedness of the wheat markets in Iraq and the
United States, [the defendants'] extraterritorial conduct in Iraq was, at most, only a 'but
for' cause of the... [harm felt] ]in the United States." Id. The court therefore declined
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.
145. See supra note 145.
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The premiere case, often cited by plaintiffs arguing for recovery for
injuries suffered abroad, is MM Global Services. Plaintiffs cite it for the
proposition that but-for causation is sufficient.'46 However, as sub-
sequent cases have correctly determined, MM Global Services does not
stand for the proposition that but-for causation is sufficient to fall under
the FTAIA exception. 47 This case is distinguishable. In MM Global
Services, the plaintiff actually purchased a product at an inflated price as
a result of price-fixing activity within the United States. As such the
court never reached the issue of whether but-for causation was suf-
ficient. Additionally, and perhaps most telling, is the fact that this
decision was prior to Empagran 11.
Another case cited for the proposition that but-for causation is
sufficient is Snaido v. Bank Austria AG. 148 In Snaido, the Second Circuit
dismissed a complaint of a plaintiff finding that the plaintiff did not
establish but-for causation. 149 Though this may indicate that the Second
Circuit would consider but-for causation, the Court decided this case
prior to Empagran II, and subsequent lower court cases in the Second
Circuit have required proximate cause. 5° Additionally, in Snaido, the
Second Circuit never reached the issue of whether but-for causation was
sufficient under the FTAIA, as the plaintiff failed to allege even but-for
causation under the second prong of the FTAIA exception, and therefore
the complaint failed regardless of the causation standard applied by the
Court.
This author was unable to find any cases where a court actually
evaluated but-for causation in the context of the statutory language of
the FTAIA in a decision rendered after Empagran II.
c. Vulnerabilities of Foreign Commerce to Antitrust Law
Though Empagran made it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring
suits based on foreign conduct, both the Supreme Court and the Court of
146. See supra note 116.
147. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d
981 (9th Cir. 2008).
148. 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Boyd, 544 F. Supp. 2d 236 (dismissing plaintiffs' case as but-for
causation alleged was not sufficient to fall under the FTAIA exception); Animal
Science Prods., Inc. v. China Nat. Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 2d 842 (D.N.J. 2008) (same).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit were careful to carve out
some limited exceptions to the rule. As a result, certain transactions and
foreign acts are still susceptible to suit under the Sherman Act.
In Empagran, the Court seemingly set forth a different standard and
elucidated different considerations for cases brought by the United
States Government as a plaintiff, than that established for private causes
of action. The Court stated that a Government plaintiff has legal author-
ity broad enough to allow it to carry out the mission of the Sherman Act
without being subject to additional concerns, such as those implicated
when a private plaintiff brings a suit. For example, the Court found it
well settled that "once the Government has borne the considerable
burden of establishing a violation of law, all doubts as to the remedy are
resolved in its favor."
' 151
It is perhaps the correct result. Many of the concerns about private
litigants are not present when the Government is the plaintiff. The Court
cites the Government's purposes in bringing the suit are generally
created by public interest motives and remedial scope, whereas a private
litigant is concerned with restitution for its individual harm.152
Additionally, the Government as plaintiff is presumably in the best
position to consider comity concerns as it interacts with foreign
governments on a regular basis on the very issue of competition laws
and other enforcement issues.153
As far as prosecution of Sherman Act claims against foreign
entities, comity is not necessarily a concern. The DOJ, FTC, and other
governmental agencies consider comity concerns prior to deciding
whether or not to bring enforcement actions. 5 4 The DOJ's purposes,
policies, and procedures illustrate this point; as an executive branch
federal agency, the DOJ is in a better position than the courts to
determine comity concerns and the conflict that the exercise of juris-
diction may create. The DOJ often works with the global community to
establish antitrust standards and cooperate with foreign nations
regarding investigation of Sherman Act claims. 55 Over 100 countries
151. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 542 U.S. 155, 170-71 (2004).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Christine A. Vamey to Participate in Eighth
Annual International Competition Network Conference in Zurich, Switzerland (May 28,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/09-at-523.htil.
154. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 2.
155. Id.
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have their own antitrust statutes, and the United States Government,
including the DOJ, has dialogue with its trading partners regarding these
guidelines in furtherance of the creation of truly global rules to police
global markets.1
5 6
Additionally, the DOJ examines many of the factors involved in the
courts' comity analyses as part of its investigation as to whether to bring
a suit against a foreign entity. For example, before determining whether
or not to challenge an alleged antitrust violation, the DOJ considers
whether in bringing such a claim there would be a conflict with a foreign
state's law.157  The DOJ also considers whether a foreign country
involved encourages a certain course of conduct, leaves parties free to
choose among different strategies, or prohibits some of those
strategies."' The FTC and other agencies entrusted with antitrust
enforcement also engage in the same type of comity analysis prior to
commencing a lawsuit under the applicable American antitrust laws.' 59
Before deciding to prosecute a particular case, governmental
agencies consider whether their activities would interfere with or
reinforce the objectives of the foreign proceeding, including any
remedies contemplated or obtained by the foreign antitrust authority, the
concerns voiced by the courts in examining comity in the subject matter
jurisdiction context are largely irrelevant. Although the possibility that
the court will examine a comity analysis provides a check on the
sufficiency of the government's pre-suit investigation of these claims,
the courts need not apply the Empagran test as stringently for Sherman
Act coverage under the FTAIA (as the reasoning for adopting the
standard dealt primarily with first and foremost with concerns of
prescriptive comity). As such, foreign conduct may be subject to
enforcement actions brought by the United States government regardless
of whether such conduct is subject to suit in private enforcement actions
and the Court in Empagran was correct in distinguishing the
Government as plaintiff.
Another exception is that conduct involving import commerce.
Conduct involving import commerce-the bringing of products or
services into the United States is exempt from the FTAIA, regardless of
the nationality of the purchasers or the locus of the purchase.
160
156. KESSLER & WALLER, supra note 12, at § 6:12.
157. DOJ Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 2, at § 3.2.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Turicentro S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Further, activities factually similar to MM Global Services are most
likely still subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction. 161 If a foreign purchaser
actually conducts a later-challenged transaction within the United States,
as in MM Global Services, it seems that courts are still open to the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in these circumstances. 162
Therefore, these types of transactions are still vulnerable to suit, even
after the adoption of the proximate cause standard, as they deal with
direct purchases within the United States and export of those purchases
from the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have consistently declined to apply the but-for causation test
advanced by plaintiffs seeking relief under the American antitrust laws
in the context of global price-fixing conspiracy claims. 163 The general
consensus among U.S. courts is that if a plaintiff in a global conspiracy
claim cannot assert proximate causation, then the case may not proceed
under the FTAIA.164 Though but-for causation has been summarily
161. MM Global Servs. Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn.
2004).
162. eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611 PJH, 2005 WL
1712084 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2005) (post-Empagran II, indicating that the holding in
MM Global Services was not brought into question by Empagran II, as it did not deal
with wholly foreign conduct where the plaintiffs had purchased product in the U.S.,
which led the court to conclude that the complaint properly alleged that defendants'
conduct had an effect on competition in and from the United States, and that plaintiffs
were injured as a result of that effect, even though part of the injury and effect were in
regard to resale in India); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust
Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 989 n.9 (noting that while the plaintiff's argument that MM Global
Services stood for the proposition that but-for causation was sufficient was flawed, the
Ninth Circuit seemed to imply that the holding in MM Global Services was still
relevant in factually similar cases).
163. See, e.g., eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611 PJH, 2005
WL 1712084, at **5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2005) (holding the plaintiffs argument that
but for the fact that "had defendants' conspiracy not inflated U.S. prices, the foreign
plaintiffs would not have been injured because lower American prices would have
driven down international prices overall, including through arbitrage; and the domestic
effects of the conspiracy caused their injuries because they had already bought some
MIO in American commerce and could have purchased the rest of their MIO from the
U.S. market had it remained competitive" was insufficient to assert jurisdiction as
probable cause was required.
164. See supra note 143.
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rejected, and courts have generally required proximate causation in the
global conspiracy context, some avenues of litigation may still be
available to private plaintiffs and some vulnerabilities to foreign conduct
still exists.
For example, one circumstance in which a foreign plaintiff can
bring a claim under the Sherman Act is where the foreign plaintiff
actually made a purchase or engaged in conduct within the United States
and suffered harm as a result of the anticompetitive conduct in the
United States. 165  Additionally, parties involved in foreign anti-
competitive conduct may still be subject to suit by the U.S.
Government. 166 Further, third-party indirect purchasers may still test the
proximate cause standard, though no case in this direct context has been
decided in the post-Empagran world, and this Note proposes that such a
case is not a permissible exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The result of the Empagran decision has yet to be fully felt, as the
question remains as to what minimum would be sufficient to establish
the requisite causal relationship. However, contrary to what some
experts and commentators felt would result from the alleged imprecise
Empagran holding, a standard has arisen which requires proximate
cause in the second prong of the FTAIA test.
165. See, e.g., MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D.
Conn. 2004) (where the plaintiffs injury arose directly from the defendants' price-
fixing conspiracy, wherein the effects were inflated prices including those in the United
States and the plaintiffs purchased the product in the United States, whereby rendering
the claim not "purely foreign"). See also In re DRAM Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981,
989 n.9 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing MM Global Services stating that the MM Global
Services plaintiffs pled direct participation in U.S. commerce (the purchase of products
at inflated prices within the United States), implicitly stating that such conduct satisfied
the FTAIA exception).
166. See supra section Ill.c.
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